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INTRODUCTION 
The Petitioners submit this Brief in reply to the arguments 
raised in Respondent' s Brief: 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
JUDGE MOFFAT ERRED IN OVERRULING JUDGE MURPHY' S HOLDING THAT 
RESPONDENT S CONSENT TO ADOPTION WAS VOLUNTARILY GIVEN 
In Point I of her appellate brief, respondent makes two 
arguments. First, she argues that the petitioners allowed Judge 
Moffat to hear the "Motion to Set Aside Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decree" and, therefore, petitioners waived 
the right to argue that Judge Moffat could not overrule the 
findings of Judge Murphy. Next, respondent argues that a 
district court need not find that a person is voluntarily and 
willingly consenting to an adoption before accepting the consent 
at the hearing required under Utah Code Ann. §78-30-8 (1987). 
Consequently, respondent concludes that Judge Moffat did not 
overrule Judge Murphy when he found that respondent's consent to 
adoption was not voluntarily given. Neither of respondent7 s 
arguments have merit. 
A* Judge Moffat's decision did overrule the prior decision 
of Jyflge MuffPhYt 
Utah Code Ann. §78-10-8 requires that consent to adoption be 
taken or approved by a judge to assure, insofar as possible, that 
the consenting party is informed and understands the consequences 
of the consent. Taylor v\ Waddoups, 241 P. 2d 157, 160 (Utah 
-1-
1952). Indeed, consents taken by a court are presumed to be 
valid and binding because the judge is able to determine whether 
the consent is given voluntarily. In re the Adoption of D. , 252 
P. 2d 223, 230 (Utah 1953). Therefore, it defies logic that a 
judge may accept a consent to adoption, as required by Utah Code 
Ann. §78-30-8, without determining that the consent is freely and 
voluntarily given. 
In the instant case, Judge Murphy specifically held that 
respondent's consent to the adoption of Infant Anonymous, "was 
given with the knowledge that by the execution of the consent she 
thereupon relinquished all parental rights as well as parental 
responsibilities in and to the child." See, Appellant' s Brief, 
at Addendum "F", Order dated June 24, 1987 at paragraph 3. 
Thus, when Judge Moffat held that respondent did not 
"consent to the release of her parental rights on an 
unconditional basis," Judge Moffat directly overruled the prior 
determination of Judge Murphy. See, Appellant' s Brief at 
Addendum "I", Minute Entry dated September 1, 1987 at pages 1-2. 
JEL Petitioners did not waive the right to argue that it 
was improper for Judge Moffat to overrule Judge Murphv. 
Respondent argues that the petitioners waived the right to 
argue that Judge Moffat improperly overruled Judge Murphy because 
petitioners did not raise the objection prior to Judge Moffat's 
decision. In support of her argument, respondent cites case law 
that sets forth the requirement that a party seeking to 
disqualify a judge for bias or prejudice must raise their 
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objection as soon as the basis for the objection is known or the 
objection is deemed waived. See also Utah Rules for Civil 
Procedure, Rule 63(b). Respondent's argument is flawed because 
the rule applicable to disqualifying a judge for bias or 
prejudice does not, and could not logically, apply to require 
that a party demand a matter be heard before the original judge 
to avoid waiving the argument that one district court judge 
cannot overrule another. 
When a party objects to a judge for bias or prejudice it is 
probable that they have knowledge of grounds for their objection 
before the judge renders a decision. If the party does not know 
of a pre-existing prejudice before judgment is entered, that 
party may object when the grounds for bias become known. It is 
also possible that the judge may not know that the party 
believes that the judge is biased. 
On the other hand, a party does not know whether a judge 
will overrule the prior determination of co-equal judge until the 
second judge renders a decision. However, the second judge is 
privy to the record in the case and should know what 
determinations have been made in the case and that he or she is 
bound by those prior determinations. Consequently, a party can 
not, and should not be required to, instruct a judge in advance 
that he is bound by the prior determinations of a co-equal 
judge. * 
Respondent cites to In re Adoption of K, 465 P. 2d 541 (Utah 
1970), for the proposition that a party can give consent to 
adoption before one judge and then revoke that consent before 
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The Utah Supreme Court has found that a party may not 
abstain from requesting modification of a judgment and fail to 
appeal the judgment then, after the time for such modification 
or appeal has expired, claim that the judgment is void because it 
improperly overruled the prior determination of a co-equal judge. 
See, in Tanner v. Mecham (In the Matter of Mecham), 53 7 P. 2d 312, 
314 (Utah 1975), However, the Supreme Court held that where the 
second judge's ruling is "attacked by a proper and timely motion 
for a new trial; and that failing by . . . appeal" the appellate 
court should vacate the second court' s decision for improperly 
overruling a co-equal judge. 
In the instant case, the petitioners timely moved to modify 
Judge Moffat's judgment on the grounds that the judgment 
overruled Judge Murphy' s determination. When that failed, 
petitioners filed the instant appeal. Thus, petitioners followed 
the proper course for objecting to the improper ruling of Judge 
Moffat. 2 
another judge. In In re Adoption of K, the second judge affirmed 
the first court' s finding that the consenting party knew and 
understood what was taking place when she consented to the 
adoption. Petitioner knows of no rule that prohibits a second 
judge from affirming the prior decision of a co-equal judge. 
Respondent infers that appellates accuse her of "forum 
shopping." That is not the case. Appellates simply explained 
that finding that a party can waive the ability to argue that 
one co-equal judge cannot overrule another would encourage forum 
shopping, by parties who want a second opportunity to have their 
case tried. There is no requirement that a court find that 
either party is forum shopping before adhering to the rule that 
one judge cannot overrule a co-equal judge. See, e. g. Conder v. 
Williams, 739 P. 2d 634 (Ut. App. 1987)(wherein this court declined 
to overrule a prior ruling of the Supreme Court after the case 
had been referred to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code 
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Finally, reviewing the transcript of the hearing held on August 
31, 1987 before Judge Moffat reveals that petitioners did not 
waive the argument that Judge Moffat should not overrule Judge 
Murphy. Petitioner' s counsel pointed out to Judge Moffat that 
Judge Murphy "specifically asked the key question: [was 
respondent] under the influence of any drugs and did she 
understand the finality of what was about to take place. " See, 
Respondent's Brief at Addendum "A". Transcript of hearing on 
Motion to Set Aside Findings of Fact, Order and Decree, August 
31, 1987 at page 9. See also. Respondent' s Brief, Addendum B; 
Reporter' s Transcript of Hearing of June 24, 1987, at pages 3-5 
(wherein respondent testifies that she understands the affidavit 
relinquishing parental rights, that she understands the finality 
involved, that she is acting freely and voluntarily and that she 
is not under the influence of drugs that impair her judgment). 
When Judge Moffat noted that he believed Judge Murphy should 
hear the Motion to Set Aside Findings of Fact, Conclusions and 
Decree of adoption, petitioners' counsel simply responded that he 
had presented the matter to the Clerk of the Court who suggested 
that it be brought before Judge Moffat. See, Transcript of 
Hearing on Motion to Set Aside Findings of Fact, Order and 
Decree, August 31, 1987 at page 9. Addendum B, Reporter" s 
Transcript of Hearing, Respondent's Brief at Addendum "A" page 
16, Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Set Aside Findings of 
Fact, Order and Decree, August 31, 1987 at page 15. That 
Ann. §78-2-2(4) (1987)). 
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response is not equivalent to consenting to allow Judge Moffat to 
overrule the prior findings of Judge Murphy. In fact, Judge 
Moffat's statement appears to acknowledge that he understood that 
he could not overrule the prior decision of Judge Murphy. Thus, 
appellant had no way of knowing that Judge Moffat would overrule 
Judge Murphy until Judge Moffat' s decision was rendered. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING RESPONDENT TO REVOKE HER 
CONSENT TO THE ADOPTION OF THE CHILD ON THE BASIS OF HER 
UNILATERAL MISTAKE. 
As set forth in petitioners' initial appellate brief, under 
Utah law a consent to adoption given before a court cannot be 
revoked unless the consent was "induced through duress, undue 
influence, or under some misrepresentation or deception; or other 
grounds which would justify release from the obligations of any 
contract." In the Matter of S, 572 P. 2d 1370, 1374 (Utah 1977); 
In re Adoption of K, 465 P. 2d 541, 542 (Utah 1970). Respondent 
cites no case that sets forth any other standard for revocation 
3 
of a consent to adoption that is given in court. 
Respondent cites In re the Interest of Perry, 641 P. 2d 178 
(Ct. App. Wash. 1982) for the proposition that the court should 
consider factors such as unfairness of the resulting bargain, the 
unavailability of independent advice and the susceptibility of 
the person persuaded when determining whether to allow 
revocation of a consent to adoption. In fact, Perry stands for 
the proposition that those criteria should be considered in 
determining whether there is unfair persuasion or undue influence 
justifying revocation of consent. 
In the instant case there is no indication that there was 
any undue influence or unfair persuasion. In fact, respondent 
admitted that she had "decided all along to go forward with the 
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In attempting to justify revocation of her consent to 
adoption, respondent states that she was told by her counselor 
that the adoption could not become final for six months. 
Although respondent understood that her consent was binding, she 
believed that she had a right, during that six months, to revoke 
4 
her consent. See, Respondent' s Brief, page 23. 
It is well established that a unilateral mistake of law is 
not grounds for release from the obligations of a contract. See, 
e. g. Royal v. Colorado State Personnel Board, 690 P. 2d 253, 255 
(Ct. App. Colo. 1983) cert dismissed 722 P. 2d 1020 (Colo. 1986); 
Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance Co. v. Wood By-products, Inc. , 107 
Idaho 1024, 695 P. 2d 409, 411 (Ct.App. 1984). Thus, although it 
is true that a party may revoke consent to an adoption if the 
consent was induced through duress, undue influence, 
misrepresentation, deception or other grounds which would 
justify release from the obligation of any contract. Unilateral 
mistake is not among "the other grounds" that justify release 
from a consent to adoption. Accordingly, it has been held that a 
party cannot revoke consent by alleging that they did not 
adoption." Respondent's counselor objectively informed 
respondent of all of the options available. Respondent' s 
obstetrician noted no reluctance on the part of respondent to 
proceed with the adoption. Petitioner' s counsel explained to 
respondent that he was not her counsel and that she was entitled 
to consult with her own counsel. Consequently, evidence 
indicates that respondent made her own decision to place the 
child for adoption, without any influence, undue or otherwise, 
from any person. 
4 
Respondent's counselor notes that she specifically 
explained to respondent that her consent could not be revoked. 
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understand the seriousness or finality of executing the consent. 
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 530 P. 2d 896, 899 (Ct. App. Az. 1975); 
Batton v. Masser, 369 P. 2d 434, 437 (Colo. 1962). 
The only other basis asserted by respondent and cited by 
Judge Moffat as grounds for allowing respondent to revoke her 
consent to the adoption is that she did not consult with 
"members of the family, including her own mother, until after the 
birth of the child, but was consulted only by a counselor at the 
Women's Health Center." See, Respondent's brief Addendum " G", 
Minute Entry dated September 1, 1987, page 2. 
As noted in petitioners' original appellate Brief, under 
Utah law there is no requirement that a minor consult with her 
family prior to consenting to an adoption and, therefore, 
certainly no such requirement for an adult. In fact, there is no 
requirement under Utah law that a natural mother consult with 
anyone prior to deciding to place a child for adoption. 
Consequently, the fact that she discussed her decision only with 
a counselor, who specialized in such matters at the Utah Women7 s 
Health Center, is no basis for allowing respondent to revoke her 
consent to adoption. 
Respondent further argues that her misunderstanding and the 
lack of her family's involvement in the decision justify allowing 
her to revoke consent because the Utah Supreme Court has stated 
that, although consent is binding to the same degree as any other 
contract, if no rights or interests of third parties have 
intervened, courts are liberal in permitting withdrawal of 
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consent. In re Adoption of F, 488 P. 2d 130, 132 (Utah 1971). 
See, Respondent' s Brief, page 22. Petitioners fail to see what 
relevance that has to the instant case. As in In re Adoption of 
F, petitioners herein were led to act upon the consent of 
respondent. They brought the baby into their home and family, 
paid the expenses for respondent and the baby. Even more 
importantly, they formed loving emotional attachments in good 
faith and reliance upon the respondent' s consent. See, In re 
Adoption of F, 488 P. 2d at 132. 
Respondent may argue, as she did in the lower court, that 
such reliance was not material because she attempted to revoke 
her consent within three days after the child was released to 
appellants. That argument is not relevant and is without 
foundation. Infant anonymous and appellants functioned as a 
family until notified of respondent's intent to revoke her 
consent — thus creating "intervening rights". Moreover, the law 
should favor early bonding between a child and adoptive parents 
and there is no evidence that such bonding, in fact, takes more 
than three days. As the Utah Supreme Court has explained 
"the policy of the law is to so operate as to encourage 
the finding of suitable homes and parents for children 
in that need. It is obvious that persons who might be 
willing to accept a child for adoption will be more 
reluctant to do so if a consenting parent is permitted 
to arbitrarily change her mind and revoke the consent, 
and thus desolate the plans of the adoptive parents and 
bring to naught all of their time, effort, expense and 
emotional involvement. . . . A moment' s reflection 
will reveal that to the degree that such commitments 
are given respect and solidarity, so they can be relied 
upon, a person desiring children will be able to accept 
and give them homes. Conversely, to the degree that 
such commitments can easily be withdrawn and the 
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adoptive plan thus destroyed, such persons will tend to 
be discouraged from doing so. " 
In the Matter of the Adoption of F, 488 P. 2d at 134. Similarly, 
in the instant case, if the court were to conclude as a matter 
of law that an adoptive parent cannot bond to an infant in three 
days it would discourage adoptive parents from immediately 
accepting and treating the child as their own. That is certainly 
not a policy that should be entrenched in Utah law. 
Thus, because in this case there is no indication that 
respondent' s consent was induced through duress, undue influence, 
misrepresentation, deception or other grounds that would justify 
release from a contract and because the interests of the 
petitioners intervened before respondent revoked her consent, 
Judge Moffat' s court erred in allowing respondent to revoke her 
consent to the adoption. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING ISSUES OF FACT ON THE 
BASIS OF CONFLICTING AFFIDAVITS. 
Respondent argues that the hearing in the trial court was 
not conducted as a Motion for Summary Judgment because the 
standard for a Motion for Summary Judgment is whether there are 
any genuine issues of material fact entitling the moving party to 
judgment as a matter of law and a Motion to Set Aside Consent 
seeks a determination by the court as to whether consent was 
given voluntarily and with knowledge of its finality. See, 
Respondent' s Brief, pages 24-25. In fact, the hearing in Judge 
Moffat' s court was conducted exactly like a Motion for Summary 
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Judgment in which the court was asked to determine, as a matter 
of law, whether respondent' s consent to adoption was given 
voluntarily and with knowledge of its finality. 
Respondent' s Motion to revoke her consent was presented to 
Judge Moffat as the respondent's "Motion to Set Aside Findings of 
Fact, and Conclusions and Decree" of adoption. In support of 
that motion, respondent submitted her affidavit. In response, 
petitioners submitted the affidavits of respondent' s counselor 
and respondent' s obstetrician. The testimony in respondent' s 
affidavit and the affidavits submitted by petitioners completely 
contradicted one another and, therefore, certainly raised issues 
of fact. Thus, Judge Moffat was asked to determine issues of 
material fact on the basis of affidavits. 
Respondent argues that because a judge makes factual 
determinations every day based upon conflicting testimony, he 
should be able to do so by affidavit or otherwise. That argument 
simply ignores the fact that when a judge is faced with a Motion 
for Summary Judgment with conflicting affidavits he is required 
to make a determination that the case go to trial so that he may 
observe the parties testifying in order to have some basis for 
judging the credibility of each witness and their testimony. 
Furthermore, this case is not a case where there was a proffer of 
evidence at a trial. This case was presented as a motion and the 
hearing thereon was a hearing on a motion, set on a Law and 
Motion calendar--where evidence beyond affidavits is not 
ordinarily accepted. Judge Moffat did not request evidence 
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beyond the affidavits and neither party offered further 
evidence. 
Respondent asks this Court to disregard the fact that the 
hearing before Judge Moffat was conducted like a Motion for 
Summary Judgment and resulted in summary disposition of the 
petitioners' rights. Instead, respondent analogizes the Motion 
presented before Judge Moffat to a Motion to Set Aside Default, 
Motions in Limine and Motions to Dismiss, which do not ordinarily 
require evidentiary hearings. Respondent fails to note at those 
motions also do not ordinarily involve conflicting affidavits 
and do not require a judge to make a final determination on the 
merits of a case on the basis of those conflicting affidavits. 
Finally, respondent argues that petitioners waived the right 
to request an evidentiary hearing by not requesting such a 
hearing. Respondent cites no authority for the proposition that 
failing to ask for an evidentiary hearing results in a waiver of 
the need to hold such a hearing when faced with contradicting 
affidavits. On the contrary, the rule is that a judge may not 
weigh evidence in conflicting affidavits but must require an 
evidentiary hearing. See, e. g. Snyder v. Merkley, 693 P. 2d 64, 65 
(Utah 1984); Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. 
Atkin, Brighton, Miles Charter, 682 P. 2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984). 
Respondent incorrectly states that evidence of the 
circumstances surrounding the consent was also offered by 
counsel. The circumstances surrounding the consent were 
contained in respondent' s affidavit and were reiterated in 
counsel' s argument. Argument made by counsel is not considered 
evidence. 
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In the instant case, Judge Moffat purported to believe the 
evidence contained in the respondent's affidavit over that 
presented in the affidavit submitted by petitioners, although 
respondent' s affidavit contradicted her prior testimony. How 
Judge Moffat made such a decision is impossible to determine in 
light of the fact that he could not observe the demeanor of any 
of the witnesses and saw only conflicting statements on paper. 
Thus, in the instant case, Judge Moffat' s summarily disposed of 
the petitioners' rights at the trial level in violation of the 
long established principle that a judge cannot summarily 
determine a question of fact on the basis of conflicting 
affidavits. Consequently, Judge Moffat erred in granting the 
"Motion to Set Aside Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Decree" of adoption without requiring an evidentiary hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing points and authorities, the 
petitioners respectfully request that this Court reverse the 
ruling of the trial court and reinstate petitioners' Petition for 
Adoption. 
DATED this 13th day of June, 1988. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Tf iVlD S. bOLC ) OWITZ 
JULIE A. BRYAN 
Attorneys for appellants 
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